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Abstract
The object of this paper is to outline the major events and policy issues related
to Articles 81, 82 and 86 EC in the last year. The paper is divided into three sec-
tions: (1) a general overview of major events (legislation and notices, European
Court cases, and European Commission decisions); (2) an outline of current pol-
icy issues, including competition and the liberal professions, review of the liner
conference block exemption, and modernisation of Art.82 EC; and (3) areas of
specific interest, meaning this year competition andgas supply, telecoms, sport,
and media.
The object of this paper is to outline the major
events and policy issues related to Articles 81, 82
and 86 EC in the last year.1
The paper is divided into three sections:
(1) a general overview of major events (legis-
lation and notices, European Court cases,
and European Commission decisions);
(2) anoutline of current policy issues, including
competition and the liberal professions, re-
view of the liner conference block exemp-
tion, and modernisation of Art.82 EC; and
(3) areas of specific interest, meaning this year
competitionandgas supply, telecoms, sport,
and media.
In the first part, EC legislation and notices and
European Court cases are covered. The Commis-
sion’s decisions are outlined, togetherwith current
policy issues and areas of specific interest, in next
month’s I.C.C.L.R.
In the author’s view, themain themesof 2003 are
as follows:
First, the author has been impressed, reading
through this year’s material, by the way that a great
deal of competition enforcement by administrations
reliesonanti-competitive inferences fromthenature
of the conduct in question. Practices are considered
tohave theobjectof restricting competitionand there-
fore areunlawful, even though their actualharmful
effects may not be proven. This is the case, for
example, with ‘‘per se’’ abusive fidelity rebates by
a dominant company, ‘‘hardcore’’ infringements,
such as price-fixing cartels, or restrictions on trade
between EU Member States, such as export bans.
The issue is also highlighted this year by the
Commission’s draft Notice on ‘‘effect of trade’’,
where there is extensive discussion of restrictions
‘‘inherently capable’’ of restricting competition.
A major theme this year is whether this is right,
especiallywhen the fines nowcanbehuge (e.g.one
company in a cartel was fined e249 million this
year). Given also the ‘‘modernisation’’ of EC com-
petition law to emphasise effect more than form,
and the way that enforcement will now be decen-
tralised, the issue is whether this should change.
From cases such as Michelin, it appears that the
European Court of First Instance may think that
some classic infringements should remain ‘‘per se’’
rules. At least in other cases there appears to be
more focus on effect.
Secondly,agreatdealofmaterial thisyear relates
to preparing for the new, decentralised EC compe-
tition enforcement model: Regulation 1/2003 and,
more recently, awhole newpackage of relateddraft
legislation and notices. Interestingly, this may in-
volve key changes to the way practitioners advise.
The question is no longer: would DG Competition
be likely to accept this? Although the Commission
will remain central, the question for practitioners,
after decentralisation, is more: would any EU
national competition authority or national court
be likely to accept this? Perhaps at times forcing a
slightly more conservative view.
Thirdly, the different ways that State action is
treated are illustrated this year. In cases described
in the paper:
 the Italian competition authoritywas found to
beentitledtodisallowanational lawcontrary
to EC competition law, but not to fine
companies which abided by such a national
context (Italian Matches);
 the Commission still fined a French slaugh-
terhouse association despite great govern-
mental pressure to enter into an unlawful
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1. The reference period is from November 2002 until
October 2003. This is a slightly revised version of a paper
givenat theIBCAdvancedECCompetitionLawconference
in Brussels, November 2003.
Table 1: Major Themes in 2003
— Enforcement through ‘‘object’’, ‘‘hardcore’’ and ‘‘per se’’
rules?
 theMichelin Case, cartels, the draft Notice on effect
on trade;
 unfair (given the huge fines)? Too formalistic for
‘‘modern’’ law?
 or a necessary enforcement rule (backed by the
courts)?
— Preparing for May 2004:
 Reg.1/2003;
 the ‘‘decentralisation package’’ of regulation and
notices;
 a new approach for practitioners?
— State action:
 the Italian Matches Case, French Beef and
Seamless Steel Tubes;
— TTBE reform and IP Guidelines:
 major changes: simplified BE, but now above the
thresholds?
— Arts 81(3) and 82 EC = clearance for the dominant
unless an abuse?
 Interbrew andmore.
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agreementwithFrench farmers, in thedepths
of the beef crisis (French Beef); and
 in another case, the Commission imposed no
fine on companies involved in a cartel for a
periodwhenanEU–Japanvoluntary restraint
agreement applied (Seamless Steel Tubes).
It appears that state action to restrict competition,
whether formal or informal, is still very topical at
the moment.
Fourthly, there ismuch discussion about reform
of the transfer of technology block exemption and
what to do above the proposed market-share ceil-
ings therein. This is still being debated on recently
published drafts.
However, one interesting point in the IP
Guidelines (and also the Commission’s proposed
Notice on Art.81(3) EC) is the way that the Com-
mission is envisaging Art.81(3) EC clearance for a
practice, even by a dominant company, provided
that this does not result in an abuse. The Commis-
sion refers to Tetra Pak I, a case in which the issue
waswhetheradominantcompanycouldbuyanother
company which held an exclusive patent licence
for a rival technology.2 The Court found that:
‘‘The mere fact that an undertaking in a dominant
position acquires an exclusive patent licence does
not per se constitute abuse within the meaning of
[what was then] Article 86 of the Treaty. For the pur-
pose of applying Article 86, the circumstances sur-
rounding the acquisition, and in particular its effects
on the structure of competition in the relevantmarket,
must be taken into account’’ (emphasis added).
Finally,a related themeisasimilar trendtoallow
justifiedagreements involvingdominant companies
in the Commission’s decisions. Thus, in Interbrew,
discussed below, the Commission allowed this
leading Belgian brewery, with some 56 per cent
market share, still to have ‘‘50% of total beer’’
requirements contracts.
All very interesting and encouraging for the
dominant, even if this may need some further
work before it is clear what is likely to be allowed.
Overview of major events




In December 2002, the Council adopted the new
‘‘Regulation 17’’ (Reg.1/2003), setting up the new
decentralised enforcement system for EC compe-
tition law, tocomeinto forceonMay1,2004.3 Itmay
be useful to outline the key features of this huge
change once again.
First, the Commissionwill no longer be the only
authority able to rule that the conditions of
Art.81(3) EC are satisfied. Both national compe-
tition authorities (‘‘NCAs’’) and national courts
may do so also. The burden of proof of the infringe-
ment is on the party or authority alleging it; the
burden of claiming the benefit of Art.81(3) EC is on
the company claiming that it applies (Arts 1 and 2).
Secondly, European competition law enforce-
ment will now be shared fully with the national
competition authorities of the Member States. The
Commission will carry out enforcement within
the procedural framework set out in Reg.1/2003.
TheNCAswill operate on thebasis ofReg.1, related
EC case law and their own national procedural
systems.
Thirdly, if Member States apply national com-
petition laws to cases involving an effect on trade
between Member States, they must also apply EC
competition law. If Art.81(1) EC is concerned, the
parallel application may not lead to divergent out-
comes. If Art.82 EC is concerned, a Member State
can apply stricter national competition rules
(Art.3).
Fourthly, the notification system is abolished,
with all pending case procedures on May 1, 2004
‘‘lapsing’’. At the end of 2002, the Commission’s
antitrust ‘‘backlog’’was 805, after 321newantitrust
cases and 363 cases closed.4 As a result, from May
2004, more than before, companies will have to
review for themselves whether their agreements
and practicesmay infringe the EC competition rules.
However, it will be a slightly different type of
assessment, concerned more with whether any rel-
evant competition authority or court which may
have to deal with a case would be likely to find an
infringement and, if so, what consequences could
follow, and less with what the Commission’s cur-
rent approach is (although that clearly will also
remain relevant).
Fifthly, there are structures for co-ordination
between the Commission and the NCAs, including
the transfer of cases and related files, and the
exchange of confidential information (Arts 11–
14). The enforcement concept is oneof a ‘‘European
Competition Network’’ (‘‘ECN’’) with the Com-
mission at the centre, but also with possibilities
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2. Case T-51/89, [1990] E.C.R. 11 309.
3. [2003]O.J. L1/1; CouncilRegulation (EC)No.1/2003of
December 16, 2002.
4. 2002 EC Commission Report on Competition Policy:
Introduction, paras 5–7, and ID statistics tables at pp.46–47.
Table 2: New Legislation/Notices (Adopted)
— Reg.1/2003:
 no surprises, but a huge change coming inMay
2004 (with Enlargement by 10);
 an ‘‘ECN’’ of 26 with the Commission at the centre;
 no notifications and decentralised Art.81(3) EC;
— insurance block exemption;
— EU–Japan co-operation agreement (joining US/
Canadian equivalents).
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for cases to move from one national competition
authority to another.
Importantly, national competition authorities
will be able touse confidential informationobtained
inCommission investigations in theirownnational
competition law procedures, where these are in
parallel to application of the EC rules.
Key also is the right of the Commission in
Art.11(6) to initiate proceedings, thereby pulling a
case to Brussels even if an NCA has already started
acting on it.Only theCommission can takedeclara-
tory decisions on its own initiative, ruling thatArts
81or 82ECdonot apply to anagreement or practice
(Art.10).
Sixthly, there are parallel but different co-
ordination procedures as between the Commis-
sion, NCAs and the national courts (Art.15). Essen-
tially,MemberStates are to sendnational judgments
on EC rules to the Commission. NCAs may offer
written observations to the national courts of their
Member State and make oral observations, if the
Court so allows. The Commission may also do so,
where thecoherentapplicationofArts81and82EC
so requires. The Commission will also provide
information to national courts or its opinion on
questions concerning the application of the EC
rules, if the national court asks.
Seventhly, giving effect to Masterfoods I,5 both
NCAs and national courts must not take decisions
which ‘‘run counter’’ to a Commission decision
concerning the same agreements or practices, or a
decision in proceedings initiated by the Com-
mission (Art.16).
Eighthly, Reg.1 also modifies the Commission’s
enforcement powers in important ways:
 TheCommissionwill have thepower to inter-
viewapersonor company,with their consent
(Art.19);
 the Commission will have the power to in-
spect premises other than a company’s, in-
cluding the homes of company directors and
staff, if there is a reasonable suspicion that
evidence is being kept there and prior
authorisation has been obtained from a
national judicial authority of the Member
State concerned (Art.21);
 the Commission may ‘‘seal’’ business prem-
ises and books or records if necessary for an
inspection (and can ask for explanations of
facts or documents related to an inspection)
(Art.20.2(d), (e)).
Ninthly, the Commission is to have the right to
take ‘‘structural remedies’’, if required, in defined
circumstances. Notably, such remedies have to be:
(i) proportionate to the infringement; (ii) necessary
to bring the infringement effectively to an end; and
(iii) there must be no equally effective behavioural
remedy, or that behavioural remedywould bemore
burdensome for the company concerned than the
structural remedy (Art.7).
Fines and penalties have also significantly
increased (Arts 23–24). A ‘‘procedural’’ infringe-
ment (such as providing misleading information)
may lead to a fine not exceeding 1 per cent of the
total turnover of a company in the business year
preceding the Commission’s decision. A ‘‘full’’
infringement (of Arts 81 or 82 EC, of an interim
measures decision, or of a decision making a com-
mitment given by a company binding) may lead to
a fine of 10 per cent of such turnover. Periodic
penalty payments for non-compliance with a pro-
cedural or full infringement may be set at not more
than 5 per cent of the average daily turnover of a
company in question in the year preceding the
Commission’s decision.
Tenthly, the Commission’s powers to take vari-
ous measures are confirmed, notably:
 Interim measures (Art.8);
 sectoral reviews ‘‘where the trend of trade
betweenMemberStates, the rigidity of prices
or other circumstances suggest that compe-
tition may be restricted’’ (Art.17); and
 withdrawal of block exemptions where, in
particular cases, it finds certain effects in-
comparable with Art.81(3) EC (NCAs have a
similar right if such effects occur in a distinct
geographicmarket in their territory) (Art.29).
Finally, we will all have to get used to new
numbers. An ‘‘Article 11 letter’’ will be an ‘‘Article
18 letter’’; a ‘‘dawnraid’’will bebasedonArt.20, not
Art.14. An ‘‘Article 19(3) Notice’’ should not occur
in the same way because notification will have
gone. However, the negative decisions envisaged
in Art.10 will still be preceded by a notice seeking
third-party comments, based now on ‘‘Art.27(4)’’.
A whole series of related notices have now been
published for comment and are discussed below
under proposed legislation.
Insurance block exemption
In February 2003, the Commission adopted and
published the revised insurance block exemption.6
This was discussed last year in detail as a draft.7
EU–Japan co-operation agreement
In July 2003, the European Union signed a co-
operation agreement with Japan on competition
matters, similar to those entered into with the
United States and Canada.8
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5. Case C-344/98, Masterfoods Ltd v HB Ice Cream Ltd,
Judgment of December 14, 2000; [2000] E.C.R. I-11369.
6. [2003] O.J. L53/8.
7. [2003] I.C.C.L.R. 45–46. See also Charro, ‘‘New block
exemption for the insurance sector’’ (2003) Competition
Law Insight 5 at p.17; Ryan, EC Commission Competition
Policy Newsletter, No.2—Summer 2003 at pp.51–52.
8. IP/03/995, July 10, 2003; [2003] O.J. L183/12.
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Proposed
A revised transfer of technology block exemption
OnOctober 1, 2003, the Commission published the
draft successor to the Transfer of Technology Block
Exemption, Reg.240/96 (‘‘the TTBE’’), together with
draft Guidelines on the application of Art.81 EC to
technology transfer agreements (‘‘the IP Guide-
lines’’).9 The main points in the draft Regulation
are as follows.
First, the Commission has hugely simplified the
TTBE, applying a ‘‘black-listed’’ (prohibited) clause
approach, but abandoning the ‘‘white and grey’’
lists of clauses permitted or ‘‘permitted under cer-
tain conditions’’.
The black-list for agreements between com-
petitors covers: (i) pricing restrictions; (ii) output
restrictions (except in a non-reciprocal licence);
(iii) the allocation of markets or customers (except
for field of use or product market restrictions in a
non-reciprocal licence and ‘‘own use’’ require-
mentson licensees); and (iv) (non-compete) restric-
tionsonalicenseeexploiting itsowntechnology,or
the parties’ ability to carry out R&D ‘‘unless such
latter restriction is indispensable to prevent the
disclosure of the licensed know-how to third par-
ties’’ (Art.4.1).
In the case of non-competitors, the black-list
covers: (i) pricing restrictions (although maximum
prices may be set or recommendations given); and
(ii) restrictions on territories or customers which
may be supplied (although the licensor’s territory/
customer group can be protected, and active sales
into another licensee’s territory/customer group
can be restricted, as well as licensee ‘‘own use’’
requirements).Restrictionsonwholesalers supply-
ing end-users and selective distributors supplying
unauthorised distributors are also allowed
(Art.4.2).
If black-listed clauses are included in an agree-
ment, it is not covered by the draft TTBE.
Other specific obligations are not exempted by
the block exemption:
 Compulsorygrant-backclausesfora licensee’s
own severable improvements or new appli-
cations of licensed technology;
 compulsory assignment clauses for improve-
ments or new applications of the licensed
technology; and
 no-challenge clauses as regards the validity/
secrecy or substantiality of IP rights.
Output restrictions in non-reciprocal agreements
betweencompetitors ornon-competeprovisions in
agreements between non-competitors (unless in-
dispensable toprotect thedisclosureof thelicensed
know-how to third parties) are also not block
exempt (Art.5).
Secondly, the draft Regulation covers copyright
software licensing, and extends to the provision of
goods or services as well as licensed manufactur-
ing. Perhaps because of this the draft TTBE has far
more of a sense of vertical distribution issues than
its predecessor and also deals with selective distri-
bution through licensees.
Thirdly, as expected, the Commission does
not block exempt multiparty technology pools,
but rather reserves block exemption for two-party
agreements (Art.2). Technology pools are, how-
ever, extensively discussed in the IP Guidelines.10
It was understood this might happen because the
Commission needs the new TTBE in force for May
1, 2004, or at the least to have resolved issues for-
merly tending to opposition procedure appli-
cations or full notification. The Commission has
also published on its website a major study on
technology pools, prepared by Charles River
Associates.11
Fourthly, as noted above, the Commission has
pursued the approach of varying what is black-
listed and the conditions for block exemption
according to whether licences are between com-
petitors or not. ‘‘Actual competitors’’ are com-
panies that license competing technologies or are
both active on the relevant product/geographic
market. ‘‘Potential competitors’’ would, ‘‘on real-
istic grounds’’, undertake the necessary invest-
ments or incur the necessary switching costs to
enter the relevant product/geographical market,
in the event of a small and permanent increase in
relative prices.
Fifthly, the Commission has continued with its
‘‘economic approach’’, limiting the possibility for
block exemption to agreements between parties
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9. Draft Commission Regulation on the application of
Art.81(3) of the Treaty, [2003] O.J. C-235/10 (proposed
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October 3, 2003.
10. Paras 202–228.
11. Antitrust: Report by Charles River Associates on
Multiparty Licensing, April 22, 2003.
Table 3: New Legislation/Notices (Proposed/Coming)
— A revised TTBE:
 NBmarket-share ceilings: 20 per cent combined
(competitor); 30 per cent individually (non-
competitor);
 only two party agreements;
 distribution parallels;
 copyright software licensing included;
— Proposed IP Guidelines:
 no exemption if abuse? Clearance if dominant?
 technology pools;
— The decentralisation package:
 guidance on ‘‘novel’’ issues;
 ‘‘NAAT’’ presumptions: less than 5 per cent market
share and less than e40 million EU turnover = not
EC law; agreement ‘‘inherently’’ capable of affecting
trade greater than e40million = EC law;
 Art.81(3) EC and efficiencies: economics and proof;
encouragement for dominant companies.
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having only defined levels of market share. This
was also expected, but is controversial, a similar
approach having been ultimately dropped for
Reg.240/96. This time the Commission does not
fear amass of notifications, since the systemwill be
abolished as the new TTBE comes into force.
The ‘‘ceiling’’ for thebenefitof thenewTTBEwill
be 20per cent for agreements between competitors,
meaning that the combined share of the parties on
the relevant technologyorproductmarketmustnot
exceed this level (Art.3.1).
In the case of agreements between non-
competitors, the ceiling is significantly higher, 30
per cent, meaning that the individual share of each
party on the relevant markets must not exceed that
level (Art.3.2).
In contrast to the Commission’s fairly positive
position as regards agreements above the Vertical
Restraints Block Exemption (‘‘the VRBE’’) ceiling,
the Commission emphasises that there ‘‘can be no
presumption’’ that technology transfer agreements
above these thresholds which fall within Art.81(1)
EC will ‘‘usually give rise to the objective advan-
tages’’ to outweigh any disadvantages which they
create for competition.12
Sixthly, the Commission has pursued themodel
of the VRBE, as regards the ‘‘modified’’ exclusivity
system for licensees in thedraft TTBE.The licensor
continues to have absolute territorial protection,
presumably on the basis thatwithout that, hewould
not license for fear of establishing companies to
compete against himself. Licensees, however, only
have protection against active sales efforts into
their territories. There is no ‘‘phased release’’ sys-
tem over time as in Reg.240/96, whereby licensees
have full territorial protection for a period and
‘‘modified exclusivity’’, with protection against
active sales efforts later.
Finally,onemaynote that thedraftTTBEreflects
the VRBE concept of withdrawal of the block
exemption by the Commission and NCAs (e.g.
‘‘where the incentives to innovate are reduced or
where access to the markets is hindered’’,13 and,
interestingly, also where parallel networks of
licences may have restrictive effects14).
Proposed IP Guidelines15
The proposed Commission Guidelines contain (on
almost 40 pages):
 Detailed explanations on the provisions of
the proposed TTBE;
 principles for the treatment under Art.81
EC of technology licensing agreements not
coveredbytheTTBE, includingdiscussionof
royaltyobligations,exclusive licensing, sales
restrictions, output restrictions, field of use
restrictions, captive use restrictions, tying
and non-compete obligations; and
 criteria forassessing technologypools, settle-
ment agreements and non-assertion agree-
ments, which, by definition, fall outside the
TTBE.
Generalprinciples for theapplicationofArticle81
EC to technology licensingagreementsnot covered
by the proposed TTBE If a technology licensing
agreement is not covered by theproposedTTBE, an
individual assessment in light of the market cir-
cumstances will establish whether the agreement
restricts competition and is, therefore, caught by
Art.81(1) EC. The only exceptions are hardcore
provisions, which are considered to restrict com-
petition by their very nature. Negative market ef-
fects may be on price, output, innovation, or the
variety or quality of goods and services.
The proposedGuidelines focus on three types of
possible restriction:
(1) Inter-technology restrictions, i.e. restrictions
on actual or potential competition thatwould
have existed had no licence been granted
(including the facilitation of explicit or tacit
collusion).Normally, thesewill be caught by
Art.81(1) EC.
(2) Intra-technology restrictions, i.e. restrictions
on competition that would have existed if
the licence had been granted without the
allegedly restrictive provision. These are
also normally caught byArt.81(1) EC, unless
the provision is objectively necessary for the
conclusion of the agreement. For example,
territorial restraintsbetweennon-competitors
may fall outside Art.81(1) EC if they are
objectively necessary in order to penetrate a
newmarket.
(3) Foreclosure of competitors can arise by rais-
ing their costs, restricting their access to
essential inputs or otherwise raising barriers
to entry.
Factors that the Commissionwill take into account
when assessing restrictive effects include the
nature of the agreement, the market position of
the parties as well as of competitors and buyers
of the licensed products, entry barriers, and the
maturity of the market.
If an agreement restricts competition, it is still
legal (under the new Reg.1/2003) if justified by its
positive market effects under Art.81(3) EC.
In practice, exemption will often turn on
whether parties with high market shares meet the
fourth condition under Art.81(3) EC, i.e. theymust
not have the potential to eliminate competition.
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12. Recital 12.
13. Recital 16.
14. Recitals 17 and 18.
15. With thanks to Axel Gutermuth for his assistance
with this section.
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Interestingly, the Commission states (as in the
draft Guidelines on Art.81(3) EC discussed below)
that a bar to clearance under Art.81(3) EC only
exists if the agreement amounts to an abuse of a
dominantpositionunderArt.82EC.16Thekeypoint
is that dominance alone is not to preclude such
clearance.
This appears to widen the commercial possi-
bilities for dominant companies and therefore
shouldbewelcometomany.However, theproposal
may still leave companies and their advisers in
some doubt about what they can do!17
Specific licensing provisions in agreements that
fall outside the proposed TTBE For technology
licensing agreements that fall outside the scope of
the proposed TTBE, the proposed Guidelines dis-
cuss how the following commonly found licensing
provisions should be assessed:
 Royalty payment obligation on the licensee;
 exclusive licensing, i.e. an obligation on the
licensor not to give other licenses;
 sales restrictions on the licensee or licensor;
 output restrictions;
 field of use restrictions on the licensee;
 captive use restrictions on the licensee;
 tying obligations on the licensee; and
 non-compete obligations on the licensee.
The assessment of these provisions under the
proposed Guidelines depends on whether or not
theparties are competitors and, if they are,whether
or not the restriction or obligation is reciprocal.
Additional factual distinctions are made with re-
gard to some of the provisions.
The proposed Guidelines are too detailed to
summarise usefully here. The following general
remarks can be made.
As a general rule, these restrictions and obli-
gations are least problematic if entered into by
non-competitors, more problematic if entered into
by competitors, and most problematic if entered
into by competitors in reciprocal licensing agree-
ments. In addition, restrictions in agreements be-
tweennon-competitorspreventing the licensee from
using the licensed technology to compete against
the licensor are generally looked upon favourably,
on the premise that a technology owner would be
likely to refrain from licensing if he cannot prevent
such competition to his own technology.
Finally, the proposed Guidelines state that
the following licensing provisions will not be
considered to be restrictive of competition
regardless of market circumstances: confidenti-
ality obligations; obligations on the licensee not to
sub-license; obligations not to use the licensed
technology after the expiry of the agreement, pro-
vided that the licensed IP remains valid and in
force; obligations to assist the licensor in enforcing
the licensed intellectual property rights; obli-
gations to pay minimum royalties or to produce a
minimum quantity of products incorporating the
licensed technology; and obligations on the li-
censee to use the licensor’s trade mark or indicate
the name of the licensor on the product.
Assessmentof technologypools Long-awaitedby
many industries, the proposed Guidelines provide
guidance on the assessment of technology pools.
Technology pools are arrangements, regardless of
their form,whereby two ormore parties assemble a
package of technology that is licensed not only to
members of the pool, but also to third parties.
Technology poolsmay set an industry standard,
but can also support competing standards. Licences
granted by a pool to third parties fall within the
scope of the proposed TTBE, but the pooling agree-
ments themselves do not.
Technology pools are assessed according to the
following principles:
 Pools combining essential technologies will
normally fall outside Art.81(1) EC. A tech-
nology is essential if there are no substitutes
inside or outside the pool and the technology
constitutes a necessary part of the package of
pooled technologies.
 Pool agreements encompassing complemen-
tary technologies,where there are substitutes
outside the pool for the included tech-
nologies, are likely to be caught by Art.81(1)
EC if the pool has a significant market pos-
ition on any relevant market.
 Relevant for the Commission’s assessment
are, notably, whether there are any pro-
competitive reasons for including the tech-
nology in the pool, whether the licensors
remain free to license their technologies in-
dependently, andwhether licensees can limit
the license to certain parts of the package
and obtain a corresponding reduction of
royalties.
 Technologies are complements rather than
substitutes (theGuidelines recognise that the
distinction isnot always clear cut)when they
are required from a technological point of
view to produce the product or carry out the
process to which the technologies relate.
 Pooling of substitute technologies will gen-
erally be considered to violate Art.81 EC.
The Guidelines also discuss additional con-
siderations that are relevant in the assessment of
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technology pools. Companies should be aware of
the following principles, in particular:
 Pools that hold a strong position on the mar-
ket should be open and non-discriminatory;
 pools should not unduly foreclose third-
party technologies or limit the creation of
alternative pools;
 the risk of a pool violating Art.81 EC can be
further reduced if participation in the pro-
cess of setting up the pool is open to all
interested parties, independent experts are
involved in the creation and operation of the
pool, the exchange of sensitive information
among the parties is limited, and a dispute
resolution mechanism exists.
Non-assertion and settlement agreements Non-
assertion and settlement agreements normally fall
outside of Art.81(1) EC, but their terms and con-
ditions may restrict competition. The Guidelines
express caution towards restrictions on the use of
the technologyand towards royaltypaymentsother
than by a one-way lump sum payment.
The decentralisation package18
In October 2003, the Commission entered the next
phase of consultation on its modernisation and
decentralisation proposals, with the publication
of a draft Regulation on Commission proceedings
under Arts 81 and 82 EC, and a number of draft
guidance Notices designed to assist NCAs and
courts in the application of the competition rules.
These measures fill out the new decentralised
competition system which is set to be fully oper-
ationalwhen Council Reg.1/2003 comes into effect
on May 1, 2004 (with the next Enlargement) and
replaces Reg.17/62. The Commission has invited
all interested parties to provide comments on the
draft procedural Regulation and the package of
draft Notices by December 5.
The package contains:
 A draft Regulation on Commission proceed-
ings under Arts 81 and 82 EC;
 a draft Notice on co-operation within the
European network of NCAs (the ECN);
 a draft Notice on co-operation between the
Commission and national courts;
 a draft Notice on the handling of complaints
by the Commission under Arts 81 and 82 EC;
 a draft Notice on ‘‘novel questions’’ ofArts 81
and 82 EC that arise in individual cases;
 draft Guidelines on the concept of ‘‘effect on
trade’’ (the dividing line between the appli-
cation of EC or national competition law); and
 draft Guidelines on the application of
Art.81(3) EC.
Each of these measures is examined below. The
Notice on ‘‘novel questions’’, the Notice on ‘‘effect
on trade’’ and the Guidelines on Art.81(3) EC
involve important newmaterial.
Draft Commission Regulation on proceedings
General. The draft Regulation deals with a broad
rangeof topics, suchas the initiationofproceedings
by the Commission, time limits, investigations by
the Commission, handling of complaints, the right
to be heard and access to the file. The Regulation is
partly based on Reg.2842/98 on the hearing of par-
ties in Arts 81 and 82 EC cases, and also, to some
extent, on theCommission’sNoticeonaccess to the
file from 1997.19
The main new points are as follows.
Interviews by the Commission. Art.2 of the draft
Regulation sets out the formalities which are to be
respected where the Commission conducts inter-
views and takes statements (Art.19 of Reg.1/2003),
or where Commission representatives ask oral ques-
tions during inspections (Art.20(2)(e) of Reg.1/
2003). Basically, the rule is that the Commission
may record the statements or declarations made,
but it must always provide a copy of any such
recording to the interviewee,or investigatedunder-
taking, andallow thisperson to communicate recti-
fications on this recordingwithin a certain deadline.
Complaints. Art.7(2) now explicitly provides
that, where the Commission has informed a com-
plainant of its reasons for rejecting a complaint and
the party in question has not reacted within the set
deadline (in principle at least four weeks), the
Commission shall reject the complaint bydecision.
Furthermore, if theCommissionrejectsacomplaint
because another authority is dealing with the case,
the Commission shall communicate to the com-
plainant which NCAwill deal with the case.
Access to the file. The draft Regulation itself sets
out basic rights and principles regarding access,
which is new, since previously this was only in a
Notice.
Draft Notice on co-operation within the network
of competition authorities General. This draft
Notice deals with the division of work between
the different NCAs and the Commission, the
consistent application of EC competition rules,
and the functioning of the Advisory Committee.
The Notice is to replace the 1997 Notice on
co-operation between the NCAs and the
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Commission.20Much of this is new.Material closely
overlapping with Reg.1 is not described here.
Principles on work-sharing. Under the new
framework, cases can be dealt with by a single
NCA, several NCAs (possibly with one NCA taking
lead) or the Commission. In most cases, the NCA
receiving a complaint or leniency application will
dealwith it.Where necessary, however, a casemay
be ‘‘reallocated’’ within the ECN on the basis of
discussions between the authorities.
There is much controversy as to whether this
will constitute an appealable act, with concern on
theonehandthatproceduraldifferencesofenforce-
ment may be material, and on the other that pro-
cedural appeals,whichcan takeyears,woulddelay
substantive enforcement. In some cases, there may
be clear advantages to cases being dealt with at
national level (e.g. where the NCA has already
done a lot of factual work in the area), while in
others there may be disadvantages, as where pos-
itions seem entrenched and not sufficiently to
reflect the broader interests of EU competition.
Cases of reallocation should normally be re-
solved within two months from the moment when
theNCAs inform theCommissionunderArt.11(3) of
Reg.1/2003.21TheAdvisoryCommitteecanalsofunc-
tion as a forum for thediscussion of case allocation.
Criteria for work-sharing. AnNCA is considered
to be ‘‘well-placed’’ to deal with a case if there is a
‘‘material link’’ with the NCA’s territory; compe-
tition there is substantially affected by an infringe-
ment; the NCA is able to effectively bring to an end
the infringement; and the NCA can gather the
necessary evidence/proof.22
The Commission is considered particularly
‘‘well-placed’’ to deal with a case if agreements/
practices have effects in three ormore countries, or
if its involvement is required fordevelopmentofEC
competition policy, effective enforcement, or ap-
propriate because of a close link with other EC
provisions belonging to Commission competence.23
AnNCA is in principle well-placed to deal with
cases that have a major effect on the territory of its
Member State.Where apracticehas itsmain effects
in the territory of two or three Member States, it is
suggested that these NCAs should consider work-
ing together on a case.
Importantly, the Regulation provides that the
allocation of cases does not create individual rights
for undertakings to have a case dealt with by a
particular authority.24
Exchange of information. In general, the possi-
bilities to exchange (confidential) information
among the different NCAs and the Commission
are very extensive, and may be expected to give
rise to discussions as to the rights of defence.
Regulation 1/2003 contains limitswhichmay be
important for companies and individuals,25 notably:
 Information exchanged cannot be used to
impose sanctionson individuals (as opposed
to sanctions on undertakings/companies),
unless the transmitting authority is able to
impose similar sanctions on individuals, or,
in theoppositecase, if the receivingauthority
maintains the same level of protection for
individuals as the transmitting authority in
the case at hand. This is particularly relevant
where national procedural law provides for
criminal sanctions on individuals, as now in
the United Kingdom.
 Information exchanged within the ECN can
only be used for the purpose of the appli-
cation of EC and, where applicable, national
competition law(applied inparallelandonly
if leading to the same outcome), and for the
‘‘subject-matter for which it was collected’’.
An application for leniency to a given authority
is not to be considered as an application for
leniency to any other authority.26 As a result, in
particular because of the importance of timing in
suchapplications, itmaybe in the interestofunder-
takings therefore to apply for leniency to all NCAs
whichmay be considered ‘‘well-placed’’ to act.
The draft Notice also specifies that:
 Information forwarded to the ECN by the
authority that has received a leniency appli-
cationwill not be used by the other members
as a basis for starting an investigation, but
they may do so on the basis of information
from other sources.27
 Information voluntarily submitted by a
leniency applicant, or information obtained
through an inspection which resulted from
the leniency application, will only be trans-
mitted with the consent of the applicant,
unless the receiving NCA has also received
a leniency application, or the receiving NCA
has committed itself in writing not to use the
information to impose sanctions on the
leniency applicant, its employees or any
other person covered by such application.28
The Commission has also made it clear that it
would like all Member States to adopt appropriate
(at best comparable) leniency programmes. Not all
have explicit rules to this effect yet. Practitioners
wouldagree that theremaybeanartificial tendency
to go to Brussels first, rather than rely on less
explicit rules at national level, even though the
centre of gravity of a case is clearly national.
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competition authorities and the Commission in handling
cases falling within the scope of Arts 85 and 86 of the EC










Draft Notice on co-operation between the Com-
mission and the national courts General. The
draft Notice elaborates on the co-operation prin-
ciplesandmechanismsprovidedforbythecase law
of the EuropeanCourts andReg.1/2003. TheNotice
is to replace the 1993 Notice on co-operation
between national courts and the Commission.29
Someof this isnew,somejustasummaryofexisting
law.
The main points are as follows:
 Where anational court appliesnational com-
petition law topractices fallingunderArts 81
or82EC, itmustalso applyArts 81or82EC to
these practices (Art.3(1) of Reg.1/2003).
 Practices that are in accordance with Art.81
EC may not be prohibited under national
competition law (Art.3(2) of Reg.1/2003).
 Practices that are not in accordance with
Art.81 EC cannot be allowed under national
competition law (Walt Wilhelm).30
 The general principle of primacy of Com-
munity law requires national courts to dis-
apply provisions of national law that conflict
with EC law rules (Simmenthal/Consorzio
Industrie Fiammiferi).31
 National courts cannot adopt decisions that
conflict with prior Commission decisions
(Art.16(1) of Reg.1/2003).32 The only way for
national courts to escape thebinding effect of
a Commission decision is through a request
for a preliminary ruling (or by distinguishing
on the facts).
 National courts must also avoid adopting
decisions that conflict with decisions con-
templated by the Commission (Art.16(1) of
Reg.1/2003). National courts may for this
reason decide to stay proceedings (Delimitis,33
Masterfoods34).
Procedural aspects of the national courts’ appli-
cationof ECcompetition law.National courts are to
apply their own procedural laws in the absence of
Community procedural law. The draft Notice re-
calls, however, the case law of the European courts
requiring that:
 Sanctions for infringement of EC law be ef-
fective, proportionate and dissuasive (Com-
mission v Greece)35;
 infringements of EC law causing harm must
give rise to damages (Crehan, etc.)36;
 national procedural law applied to enforce
EC law must not make such enforcement
excessively difficult (Rewe/Comet)37 and
must not be less favourable than rules ap-
plied to enforce national law (Rewe, etc.).
This is likely to be a developing area in national
court cases, as plaintiffs seek to benefit from any
higher standards of procedural law which are rel-
evant (at least pending any possible harmonisation
of procedural law).
Co-operationbetweenCommissionandnational
courts—Commission as ‘‘amicus curiae’’. The
Commission’s assistance to national courts may
take different forms38:
 The Commission has the duty to transmit
information to national courts that seek it,
e.g. documents held by Commission, infor-
mation on whether Commission is dealing/
has dealt with a case, and information on the
timing of a decision (see Art.15(1) of Reg.1/
2003). To some extent, this has been done in
the past, but with mixed results. This may
well increase in the future.
 Thenationalcourtmayask theCommission’s
opinion on economic, factual and legal mat-
ters (Art.15(1) of Reg.1/2003). However, the
Commission will not consider the merits of
the case.39 Again, this has been done in the
past, sometimesevenbyarbitrators.This also
may increase in the future.
 The Commission may submit written obser-
vations to the national court with regard
to particular cases, where the coherent
application of Arts 81–82 EC so requires
(Art.15(3) ).40 This is an important possi-
bility, to be used on points of law, which
may perhaps allow for more realistic deci-
sions in terms of time than the wholly unac-
ceptable 12-year saga of Masterfoods II.41
Observations may also be oral if the court
agrees.
Pursuant to Art.287 EC, the Commission may
only transmit information covered by professional
secrecy if the court can guarantee protection of
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38. Paras 21–35.
39. Para.29.
40. TheNCAscanalsodosowithout therequirement that
this is ‘‘necessary for the coherent application’’ of the law.
41. The Commission itself sees it as more of an excep-
tional measure than a systematic practice, the whole idea
being to decentralise enforcement, leaving matters to
others to decide.
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confidential business secrets. It is anopenquestion
how this will work.
The assistance offered by the Commission does
not bind the national court. It is hoped that the
Commissionwill treat thismore openly than in the
past, providing comments as it does in Art.234
(formerlyArt.177) EC submissions to the European
Court of Justice (‘‘ECJ’’). In the end, the court de-
cides, and, if uncertain, can still refer to the ECJ.
For reasons of objectivity, the Commission will
not hear anyof theparties about its assistance to the
national courts. If ithashadcontactswithanyof the
parties, it will simply inform the court thereof.
Otherwise, the draft notes that the Commission
must be provided with copies of all judgments of
national courts applying Arts 81–82 EC (Art.15(2)
of Reg.1/2003).
Draft Notice on the handling of complaints under
Articles 81 and 82 EC General. This Notice gives
indications when to complain to the Commission
or anNCA or to bring a case before a national court,
and sets out the procedure for treatment of com-
plaints by the Commission.Most of this is not new.
However, it is useful to see the proposed ‘‘route
map’’.
The following are the main points:
 As between the national courts and the com-
petitionauthorities, theCommission empha-
sises that:
— The competition authorities act in the
general interest and must thus set pri-
orities in the treatment of cases;
— national courts are to safeguard rights of
individuals and are bound to rule on a
certain case.
 As between the Commission and an NCA:
— The Commission invites complainants
to target the appropriate authority in
order to reduce the potential need for
reallocation within the ECN. Presum-
ably, over time, we will know when to
gowhere—it is not that clear now, partly
because of the built-in flexibility of the
system as proposed.
 The Commission notes that persons/under-
takings can choose between:
— Lodging a formal complaint; or
— providing ‘‘market information’’ to the
Commission which can be the starting
point for an investigation by the Com-
mission.Apparently, the idea is that this
canbedoneon theCommission’s special
website,42 even on an anonymous basis!
Requirement of legitimate interest. A legit-
imate interest may be claimed by undertakings,
associations of undertakings entitled to represent
their interests, consumer organisations and public
authorities, for example in their capacity asbuyers/
users of goods/services. A legitimate interest is
assumed for undertakings or associations which
are operating in the relevant market concerned or
whose interests are capable of being directly and
adversely affected by the conduct complained of.
The Commission may verify whether this require-
ment is fulfilled ‘‘at any stage of the investigation’’.
Assessment of a complaint—assessment of
‘‘Community interest’’. The Commission notes
that it is entitled to reject a complaint for lack of
Community interest (Automec II). Otherwise, one
may think that the criterion as to whether the com-
plainant can assert his right before the national
courts is likely to have an increased importance
under the new system.
The draft Notice also emphasises that the pro-
cedural rightsof complainantsare less far-reaching
than those of the undertakings concerned.43 Im-
portantly, the Commission also notes that where
it rejects a complaint, its assessment does not
definitively rule on whether Arts 81 or 82 EC are
infringed, and does not prevent NCAs or national
courts applying Arts 81 or 82 EC to such practices.
Draft Notice on guidance letters for novel
questions General. The abolition of the notifi-
cation system for the application of Art.81 EC and
its replacement with the new, decentralised ‘‘di-
rectly applicable system’’ clearly affects legal cer-
tainty. Up to now, companies could notify in the
case of new business practices, or issues which
could only be assessed on the basis of analogous
principles orwhich overtly sought to test the limits
of the apparently applicable existing rules.
Now, companies will have to self-assess in such
cases and, in the caseofArt.81(3)EC, theywillhave
to consider not just whether the Commission will
clear the practice, but also whether the NCAs or
national courts whichmay be involvedwill clear it.
The Commission will, however, remain central,
above all because of the confirmation of its special
role inMasterfoods I.
The draft Notice on guidance letters confirms
that the Commission may provide informal guid-
ance in awritten statement (‘‘guidance letters’’) with
regard to novel questions where it considers this ap-
propriate and subject to its enforcement priorities.
Recently, there have been suggestions that the
Commission now envisages a more extensive role
for guidance letters than before. Previously, the
Commission was concerned not to have continued
notification and comfort letters ‘‘by the back door’’.
Perhaps the thought now is that this may be an
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important avenue for the Commission to stay in
touchwithmarket development and,where appro-
priate, to start cases for Art.10 decisions on
‘‘findings of inapplicability’’.
On the face of the text, the issuing of guidance
letterswill be reserved to cases presenting a ‘‘genu-
inely unresolved question’’, and it is finally for the
Commission to decidewhether to process a request
for guidance. There is no positive commitment or
obligation to do so.
Prerequisites for the issuanceofguidance letters.
The Commission will consider requests for infor-
mal guidance only where:
 A case presents a question for which there is
noclarification (in theEC legal framework, in
publicly available general guidance, in case
law/decision-making practice or in previous
guidance letters);
 the clarification of the novel question seems
prima facie useful, taking into account the
economic importance for the consumers, the
potential widespread character of the prac-
tice, the scope of investments and the poss-
ible effects on structural operations;
 the issuing of the guidance letter does not
require further fact-finding.
The Commission will not consider a request for
informal guidance where:
 Identical or similar questions are pending
before the European Courts;
 the practice at stake is the subject of proceed-
ings before the Commission, national courts
or NCAs.
Effects of the guidance letters. A guidance letter
will not bind EC Courts, national courts or NCAs.
The Commission does not consider itself bound by
guidance letters, in that it can always take a differ-
ent approach in its assessment on the basis of a
complaint. However, the Commission will ‘‘nor-
mally’’ take a previous guidance letter into account
when dealing with the same facts and where there
are no new developments in the case law of the
European Courts.
It remains to be seen whether guidance letters
will be appealable acts.
Draft Guidelines on ‘‘effect of trade’’ General.
The purpose of the Guidelines is to assist NCAs
and national courts in their determination as to
whether an agreement or practice ‘‘mayaffect trade
between Member States’’ and thus be subject to
Art.81 EC or Art.82 EC. The draft Guidelines sum-
marise the principles developed over the years to
provide a methodology for NCAs and national
courts to use in their examinations. (These are not
repeated here.) However, the Guidelines also go
further and establish a rule (the so-called ‘‘no
appreciable affectation of trade (NAAT) rule’’)
indicating when agreements are unlikely to be
capable of affecting trade betweenMember States.
This is new. In practice, to work out if a restric-
tion is caught by EC law, the draft Guidelines also
need to be read with the parallel Notice on what is
an appreciable restriction on competition.44
Interestingly, given current debates, there is
much material on how restrictions ‘‘inherently’’ or
‘‘by their very nature’’ affect competition.
First, the Commission emphasises that the no-
tionof ‘‘mayaffect’’ tradedoesnot require anactual
effect on trade: it is sufficient if an agreement/
practice is capable of having such an effect. Thus,
there is no need to calculate the actual volume of
trade that is affected.
Community lawconsiders certain typesof agree-
ment to be by their nature capable of having an
effect on trade, such as cross-border cartels and
agreements relating to imports/exports. In other
cases, the nature of the product can be relevant.
For example, agreements/practices concerning
products that are easily traded across borders or
that are important for entry into a market are more
readily capable of affecting trade than others.
Once an effect on cross-border trade is estab-
lished, the nature of that effect is considered irrele-
vant. Thus, jurisdiction is established even if the
agreement/practice causes an increase in trade.
Similarly, it does not matter whether the effect on
cross-border trade is direct (generally for products
covered by the agreement/practice) or indirect
(generally for products related to those covered by
the agreement/practice, or where the agreement/
practice does not directly regulate the sale of the
covered product).
Finally, even if the agreement/practice is not
capable of affecting trade when it is implemented,
Arts 81 and 82 EC will still be applicable if effects
may occur in the future with a sufficient degree of
probability. This will be the case when the current
market/legal conditions would not allow an effect
on trade but are likely to change in the foreseeable
future.
Secondly, the draft Guidelines also state that
Arts 81 and 82 EC apply only where the agree-
ment/practice is capable of having effects of a ‘‘cer-
tainmagnitude’’. On the case law, sales amounting
toabout5percentof themarketcanbesufficient for
this purpose. For vertical agreements, the cumulat-
ive effects of parallel networks of similar agree-
ments are also relevant. Agreements between
small and medium enterprises, on the other hand,
are presumed not to be capable of affecting trade
betweenMember States.
The most significant aspect of the draft Guide-
lines is the formulation of a general presumption,
applicable to all types of agreements, defining
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when there will be no appreciable effect on trade
between Member States (the ‘‘NAAT’’ rule).45
To invoke the presumption, two conditions
must be met:
(1) The parties must have an aggregate market
shareonanyaffectedmarketofnotmore than
5 per cent; and
(2) either the parties (in the case of horizontal
agreements) or the supplier (in the case of
vertical agreements) must have an aggregate
annual Community turnover in the products
concerned of not more than e40 million.
While the NAAT rule creates a presumption
that the agreement does not affect trade between
Member States, the Guidelines also outline an
(opposing) presumption in cases of agreements/
practices that, by their nature, are capable of affect-
ing trade. For such agreements, where the turn-
over exceeds the e40 million threshold for the
NAAT rule, there is a presumption that the effects
on trade are appreciable. For other agreements,
exceeding the thresholds would not give rise to
such a presumption.
Application to various agreement. Having set
out the principles relevant to the assessment of
effect on trade, the draft Guidelines then apply
them to various types of agreement. Significant
points in this respect are as follows:
 Foreclosure effects (such as from exclusive
purchasingobligations) in relation tovertical
agreementsmay limit trade betweenMember
States.
 Whenassessing theappreciabilityofaneffect
on trade caused by either exploitative or
exclusionary abuses under Art.82 EC, the
very existence of the dominant position im-
plies that competition is already weakened
and the ability of conduct that further
weakens competition to affect trade is nor-
mally appreciable.
 Sector-wide standardisation or certification
regimes that are more difficult for competi-
tors in otherMember States to fulfil normally
have an effect on trade.
 Where a regional market only is affected, the
volume of sales affected must be significant
in comparison to the overall volume of sales
in the Member State. Agreements that cover
areas with a high concentration of demand
are therefore more likely to have an effect on
trade between Member States than those in
other areas.
 Trade is also capable of being affected when
infrastructures such as airports and ports
(important for providing cross-border ser-
vices) are affected.
DraftGuidelinesontheapplicationofArticle81(3)EC
General. The aim of the draft Guidelines is to build
on and provide more detailed guidance than that
contained in the current Guidelines on vertical
restraints and horizontal agreements in order for
companies to ‘‘self-assess’’ agreements, and NCAs
and national courts to apply Art.81(3) EC. This is
new, important and explicitly economic.
Basic principles of Art.81(1) EC. Before the
Guidelines examine the criteria for the application
ofArt.81(3) EC, they set out briefly theprinciples of
Art.81(1) EC.
Agreements/practices which have the object of
restricting competition, such as price-fixing or
market-sharing (for horizontal agreements) and
resalepricemaintenanceor absolute territorialpro-
tection (for vertical agreements), are presumed to
have negative effects on competition and come
within the scope of Art.81(1) EC without the need
to demonstrate actual effects on the market. For
other agreements/practices, sufficient negative
effects on competitionmust be shown. Such effects
are likely to occur when at least one of the parties
obtains some degree of market power, albeit of
a lower level than would be necessary for the
application of Art.82 EC.
To assess whether an agreement is restrictive of
competitionbecauseof its effects on themarket, the
Guidelines propose two questions46:
(1) Does the agreement restrict the competition
(actual or potential) that would have existed
‘‘in the absence of the agreement’’?
(2) Does the agreement restrict the competition
(actual or potential) that would have existed
‘‘in the absence of the alleged restriction of
competition’’?
According to the Guidelines, the second question
relates to the issueofwhether therestriction isobject-
ively necessary for the conclusion of the agreement.
The Commission also provides guidance on the
treatment of ancillary restraints (alleged restric-
tions of competition which are directly related
and necessary to the implementation of a non-
restrictive transaction and are proportionate to it).
The Commission specifically points out that the
application of the ancillary restraint concept does
not involve any weighing of pro-competitive and
anti-competitive effects, such balancing being
reserved for Art.81(3) EC.
This discussion is interesting, but not entirely
clear, as we consider when restrictions are outside
Art.81(1) EC or capable of being cleared under
Art.81(3) EC (which may be significant for the bur-
den of proof). It should be noted, however, that
the Court’s case law and previous Commission
practice is also perhaps not that clear. Recently, in
Metropole andMasterfoods II, the European Court
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has emphasised that economic assessments are in
Art.81(3) EC only.
Basic principles of Art.81(3) EC. A number of
general principles are relevant to Art.81(3) EC as a
whole:
 TheGuidelines stress thatArt.81(3)ECapplies
to any and all agreements that come within
the scope of Art.81(1) EC, even those involv-
ing so-called ‘‘hardcore’’ restrictions (price-
fixing, output limitation,market-sharing, etc.).
 Art.81(3) EC can be applied individually or
through theblockexemptions (which remain
in force under the new regime).
 The four conditions of Art.81(3) EC are
exhaustive.
 Asageneralmatter, restrictions inonemarket
or area cannot be offset by efficiencies and
consumerbenefits inanother.However, such
benefitswill be relevant in relation to closely
interrelated markets.
 The benefit of Art.81(3) EC lasts only as long
as the conditions are met. If the facts relied
on change materially, the exception under
Art.81(3)ECno longer applies. (Another con-
troversial changewith the new system, since
before,whenexemptionwasgranted itwas for
a defined period, for which there was greater
certainty as to competition compliance.)
 However, the Commission states that where
the agreement is an irreversible event, such
as the withdrawal from a research project,
Art.81(3) EC remains applicable even if
future events change the market conditions.
The draft Guidelines examine each condition of
Art.81(3)EC individually, althoughnot in theorder
in which they appear. Each of the four conditions
must be met in order for Art.81(3) EC to save a
restriction.
First condition—efficiency gains. Objective effi-
cienciesonlycanbe taken intoaccount,meaning that
costsavingsarisingfromtheexerciseofmarketpower
will not be relevant. The efficiencies must result
from the economic activity which forms the object
of the agreement, and they must be substantiated.
To substantiate efficiencies, companies must
provide verifiable data on the nature of the ef-
ficiencies, the link to the agreement, the likelihood
and magnitude of the efficiencies, how and when
they will be achieved, and the cost of any ef-
ficiencies. The latter is relevant because Art.81(3)
EC counts only net efficiencies.
TheGuidelinesprovide anumberof examplesof
efficiencies (which are not intended to be exhaus-
tive).47 In general, these examples are not contro-
versial. They include:
 cost efficiencies from the development of
new technologies or production methods;
 synergies from the integration of existing
assets;
 economies of scale, such as combination of
logistics operations;
 economies of scope, such as distribution of
similar products together; and
 efficiencies from better planning, inventory
reduction and increased capacityutilisation.
However, some efficiencies listed by the Guide-
lines may prove harder to substantiate, namely
‘‘learning efficiencies’’ arising from expertise gained
by focusing on a particular process or task. The
Guidelines also refer to efficiencies in the form
of technical and technological advances through
joint researchanddevelopment or joint production
and improvements in product quality and ser-
vice levels, such as those arising from specialised
distribution.
There is no discussion of environmental gains,
which one might have expected after the recent
changes to the EC Treaty and recent Commission
practice.48 One senses that such considerations are
to be dealt with mainly in the application of
Art.81(1) EC, and that the Commission (and the
Court) would prefer Art.81(3) EC to remain essen-
tially economic.
Third condition—indispensability of the restric-
tions. This condition has two parts.
First, theremust be no other practicable and less
restrictivemeans toachieve theclaimedefficiencies.
For example, companies claiming economies of
scale or scope will have to substantiate why
internal growth and price competition would not
have achieved the same result. A key factor for
companies will be to determine the minimum
efficient scale on themarket, i.e. the level of output
necessary to minimise average cost and exhaust
economies of scale. The larger the minimum
efficient scale, the more likely that efficiencies
will be specific to the agreement. Certain types of
efficiencies, namely synergies through the com-
bination of complementary assets/capabilities,
are presumed to be specific to the agreement.
Secondly, it must be shown that the efficiencies
would be eliminated or significantly reduced with-
out the restrictions. The greater the restriction, the
stricter the test. On the other hand, where the
success of a product is uncertain, greater restric-
tions may be necessary to ensure that the effi-
ciencies will materialise. Similarly, substantial
sunk investments are more likely to justify strict
restrictions. If a restriction is indispensableonly for
a certain period, the exception in Art.81(3) EC will
apply only for that period.
Second condition—fair share for consumers.
The draft Guidelines specify that this implies that
the pass-on of benefits at least compensates for
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the actual or likely negative consequences of the
agreement, so that thenet effect of the overall agree-
ment is neutral from a consumer viewpoint.
The draft Guidelines highlight a number of fac-
tors that couldhaveanegativeeffectonanypass-on
of benefits in an elaborate and newly explicit way:
 A time lag between implementation of the
agreement and materialisation of the effi-
ciencies will reduce the value of the effi-
ciencies for consumers. The draft Guidelines
therefore state that the value of future gains
must be ‘‘discounted’’ by applying an appro-
priate discount rate. (However, they do not
provide any guidance on what such a rate
could be in any given situation.)
 Where an agreement gives companies the
ability to achieve efficiencies early (‘‘lead
time’’), the draft Guidelines state that any
likely negative impact on consumers follow-
ing this leadtimehas tobe taken intoaccount.
The concern of the Guidelines is that the
agreement could lead to a strong market pos-
ition and thus the ability to charge a higher
price, and that the efficiencies would not
fully compensate.
 In a similar vein, the draft Guidelines high-
light that competition is an important long-
term driver of efficiency and that the impact
of the agreement on such competition must
beweighedagainst theefficienciescreatedby
the agreement. Interestingly, thedraft Guide-
lines here refer to dominant firms as firms
that may have less incentive to maintain or
build on efficiencies because of a lack of
competitive restraint.49
 The fact that efficiency gains may not affect
the entire cost structure of the companymust
be taken into account. Thus, a 6 per cent
reduction in production costs will count as
only a 2 per cent benefit to consumers if
production costs make up one-third of the
costs on which prices are determined.
In assessing the pass-on of benefits to con-
sumers, the draft Guidelines highlight that pass-
on is likely to occur where cost efficiencies allow
companies to expand output and increase profit.
Where capacity constraints exist, pass-on is likely
to take longer.Markets subject to tacit collusion are
also likely to experience slower pass-on, although
insomecases theefficienciesmaybeenoughto turn
a smaller player into a ‘‘maverick’’ to challenge the
oligopoly.
The key element in reviewing the likelihood of
consumer pass-on is that the pricing decisions of
companies are determined by variable, as opposed
to fixed,costs.Therefore,consumerpass-onismore
likely when the cost efficiencies allow reductions
in variable costs. Once it is determined that con-
sumerpass-onis likely, the rateof suchpass-onwill
dependonthepriceelasticityofdemand (theextent
to which demand is responsive to a decrease in
price). The higher the price elasticity of demand,
the greater the pass-on rate.
The draft Guidelines recognise that non-cost
efficiencies (for example, efficiencies resulting in
new and improved products) are harder to assess
quantitatively and require a certain value judg-
ment. According to the Guidelines, once the value
stemming from any improvements to consumers
outweighs any harm from an increase in prices
stemming from the agreement, then the test will
be fulfilled.
Fourth condition—no elimination of competi-
tion. The draft Guidelines reiterate that compe-
tition is an essential driver of economic efficiency.
Therefore, the ultimate aim of Art.81 EC is to
protect the competitive process in the long term
as well as the short term. To this end, protection
of the long-term competitive structure is to be
given priority over potentially pro-competitive
efficiency gains that could result in the short
term.50 The draft Guidelines do not give an indi-
cation ofwhat periodwould be sufficient to qualify
as ‘‘long term’’.
Interestingly,theCommissionstatesthatArt.81(3)
EC has to be interpreted consistently with Art.82
EC, so that it would prevent the exemption of a
restrictive agreement that constitutes an abuse of
a dominant position (but not just the creation of a
dominant position).51 However, the Commission
emphasises that not all restrictive agreements
concluded by dominant companies amount to an
abuse.An individual examinationmay thereforebe
necessary todetermine if suchagreements couldbe
objectively justified.
The factors in any examination under the fourth
condition are the degree of competition prior to the
agreement and the impact of the agreement on that
competition. Both actual and potential competi-
tion are relevant. For actual competition, market
share, capacity restraints and costs of production
will have to be assessed, as will evidence of past
competitive interaction. The assessment of poten-
tial competition requires entry barriers to be
assessed. This requires an evaluation of regulatory
barriers, sunk costs of entry, theminimumefficient
scale of the industry and the likely response of
current players, among other factors.
This is interesting material. One may think that
encouraging specialised national courts to deal
with such issues is essential, if they are to be dealt
with effectively! It may also be encouraging for
dominant companies.
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On September 30, 2003, the Commission also
published a draft amendment to the Liner
Consortia Block Exemption Reg.823/200052 (‘‘the
LCBE’’). This is only intended to apply from May
1, 2004 until April 25, 2005, when the LCBE is due
for renewal in any event. What the proposed
amendment does is to align the LCBE with Reg.1/
2003, by:
(1) abolishing the ‘‘opposition procedure’’,
whereby a consortium with market share
between 30–35 per cent (depending on the
circumstances) and 50 per cent could be
notified to theCommission andcomewithin
the LCBE, if not opposed by theCommission
within six months; and
(2) abolishing the ability for a consortium with
market share above 50 per cent to be notified
to theCommission for individual exemption
after May 1, 2004.
Instead, Reg.823/2000 will provide that con-
sortia, claiming the benefit of the LCBERegulation,
mustbeable, onnot less thanonemonth’snotice, to
demonstrate to the Commission or NCA that the
relevant conditions for exemption in the LCBE are
met, and submit the consortiumagreement inques-
tion. The Commission also indicates that the Com-
mission or the NCAs can withdraw the benefit of
the LCBE, in line with Reg.1/2003.
In February 2003, the Commission adopted a
Proposal for a Council Regulation amending
existing regulations in the air transport sector in
order to give the Commission clearer statutory
enforcement powers for air transport between the
European Union and third countries, and the
related right to grant block exemptions if appro-
priate.53 In recent years, the main transatlantic
alliance cases have been handled without such a
proceduralpowerbasis, inco-operationwithMem-
ber States directly concerned. The Commission’s
idea is that its powers in this field should be
covered by Reg.1/2003. This is not new and still
highly controversial.54
In February and July 2003, the Commission also
adopted recommendations in relation to the
Framework Directive for electronic communi-
cations networks and services on product and ser-
vice markets susceptible to ex ante regulation and
notifications, time limits, and consultations pro-
vided for in that Directive.
European Court cases (ECJ and CFI)
Michelin
On September 30, 2003, in Michelin v Com-
mission,55 the European Court of First Instance
(‘‘CFI’’) gave its judgment in the appeal against the
Commission’s decision imposing on Michelin a
e19.76 million fine for having applied fidelity
rebates to its dealers in truck and heavy vehicle
new-replacement tyres and retreads.56 Michelin’s
arguments were rejected and the Commission’s
decision upheld.
In the process, the Court made a number of
important clarifications to the existing case law
on fidelity rebates.
First, and in general, the Court applied what it
repeatedly emphasised was ‘‘settled case law’’ on
fidelity rebates under Art.82 EC, based on the first
Michelin judgment,57 theHoffmann-LaRoche judg-
ment58 and other similar cases.59 This case law
establishes the unlawfulness of rebate systems
practised by dominant companies which put great
pressure on resellers not to buy from other sup-
pliers and which cannot be shown to be strictly
cost-justified.
Specifically, the Court had to consider the
Michelinrebate systems,where the rebates increased
according to the reseller’s sales turnover, in a scale
with many steps (some 47 to 54 steps in one form,
and 18 in another). One scale concerned sales turn-
over inall typesof tyre (save for two), and twoscales
dealt with these excepted types. The scales had a
reference period of one year. The Court held that
these rebate systems constituted fidelity rebates
because they applied to the reseller’s entire sales
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turnover with Michelin and had this length of ref-
erence period.
As regards the length of the reference period of
the rebate, theCourt confirmed that, contrary to the
position taken by the Commission in its decision,
the European Courts had never ruled that the refer-
ence period could not be more than three months.
However, the Court emphasised that the loyalty-
inducing character of a system based on total turn-
over achieved increased inproportion to the length
of reference period.60
As regards the loyalty effect of a total turnover
system, the Court compared the small gain to the
reseller if anadditional rebatewereonly appliedon
the amount of sales turnover above a threshold in
order to move a single step to the next threshold in
thescale,with themuchhighergain to the reseller if
the additional rebate were applied to the reseller’s
total sales turnover.61
The Court noted that if these quantity rebates
were based on a clear economic return, then they
could be objectively justified and lawful.However,
theCourt emphasised that specificproven econom-
ies (such as of scale)were required. SinceMichelin
had only provided general statements to this effect,
these were not established.
Importantly, the Court also made it clear that a
system of fidelity rebates is contrary to Art.82 EC
‘‘whether or not it is transparent’’.62 Many had
argued since the first Michelin case that the trans-
parency of themechanismof the rebates applied by
a dominant firm was key to its justification under
Art.82 EC. The Court found on the facts that the
Michelin system ‘‘was complex’’ and ‘‘made it im-
possible for the resellers to assess the true price of
the tyres at the moment of purchase’’.
Secondly, the Court considered whether
Michelin’s ‘‘service rebate’’ was lawful and found
that it was not. This was a system giving points to
resellers if they carried out various tasks. If enough
pointswere achieved, a rebatewas granted. Broadly,
theCommissionobjected to thesystem,on thebasis
that it involved subjective elements and left a mar-
gin of discretion toMichelin as towhether itwould
award points and therefore rebates. For example,
pointswere awarded if a reseller contributed ‘‘posi-
tively’’ to the launchofnewMichelinproducts.The
Court agreedwith theCommission that thiswas too
vague and therefore unfair and abusive: rebates by
dominant companies had to be based on an object-
ive economic justification.
Thirdly, the Court considered whether the so-
called ‘‘friendsofMichelin’’ co-operationclubwith
large distributors was abusive, and found that it
was. The Commission’s objection to this club was
that it was used by Michelin to crystallise or im-
prove itsmarket share, givingMichelinexceptional
insight into theactivitiesof itsmembersandrequir-
ing members to useMichelin for the first retread of
Michelin tyres.
The Court agreed, noting that access to the club
was conditional on an obligation to achieve a mar-
ket share or ‘‘temperature’’ with Michelin (share of
sales in Michelin products). Members of the club
were further required to hold a sufficient stock of
Michelin products to meet demand immediately.
Obligations to ‘‘put forward’’ theMichelin brand
and not to turn ‘‘spontaneous demand’’ for
Michelin products to other products also served
to crystallise, if not improve, Michelin’s market
position. This is another controversial finding,
since many companies think it fair to say to a cus-
tomer: ‘‘Do not turn customers to other products if
they ask for mine.’’ The Commission’s view, con-
firmed by the Court, is that a dominant company
cannotpay rebates to induce distributors to respect
such ‘‘fair play’’.
TheCourt also found that the informationwhich
the resellers had to give Michelin went too far,
allowingMichelin toomuch control over its distri-
bution. Indeed, the Court noted that the infor-
mation requirements made it impossible for the
club’s members to increase their business with
Michelin’s competitorswithoutMichelin knowing
about it.
Finally, the Court held that the obligation on
resellers to give Michelin the first retread business
on their tyres abusively barred access to the retread
market.
Interestingly, Michelin also argued that the
Commission was obliged to show concrete effects
flowing fromthepractices inquestionfor there tobe
an abuse. The Court disagreed. Abusive conduct
had only to tend to restrict competition or, in other
words, the conduct had to be of a nature or capable
of having such an effect.63 If the object of restricting
competition were shown, the conduct is con-
sidered capable of having such an effect, and that
is enough. The Court also noted that, in the AKZO
predatory pricing case, no proof of concrete effects
had been required. Pricing below average variable
cost was considered per se abusive.
Onthewhole, the judgment isanorthodoxappli-
cationofsettledcase law.64However, it isasourceof
much controversy already, since it brings disap-
pointment for practitioners, economists and domi-
nant companies who continue to find it difficult
that dominant companies are prevented from com-
peting, as they see it, ‘‘normally’’ with their smaller
rivals, with the same type of rebates that they use
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(while accepting that their pricing must be above
average total costs).
This is particularly so in view of the fact that
rebates normally do not just follow a strict cost-
related structure. They usually reflect also history
and competition. Forcing dominant firms to find
only strict cost justifications for their rebates, in-
volving minute and complex appreciations and
resulting in rebates which are less attractive than
non cost-justified competing offers by the non-
dominant, is therefore not popular with the
dominant.
It also remains an open question how strict the
economic justification must be, if all the obvious
‘‘red flags’’ as to prohibited forms of rebate in the
Court’s case laware observed. TheCourt appears to
underline that thecost justificationshouldbeclear.
In practice, the Commission has brought relatively
few cases, usually where there were many clear
aspects to the abuse.
On the other hand, many will be pleased to see
that the ‘‘three-month reference period rule’’ is just
the Commission’s proposed safe harbour, and not
accepted as such by the Court as an obvious ‘‘red
flag’’. Longer reference periods may be allowed
depending on the circumstances.
The statement that there is no need to demon-
strate anti-competitive effect for a finding of abuse
when there is an anti-competitive object is highly
topical, given new debate on the reform of Art.82
EC. The Court actually says that the demonstration
of the ‘‘object and anti-competitive effect’’ are
mixed together in the context of Art.82 EC.65
Again, many will be disappointed, arguing that
if, for example, a dominant company were losing
market share, the per se rule is wrong, and just
condemns the ‘‘dominant’’ to an unfairly high stand-
ard for rebates, until they are no longer dominant.
Equally, that an unlawful and unproven exclu-
sionary object shouldnot be inferred fromanormal
and legitimatedesire to sellmore and, in that sense,
induce loyalty.
The question as to how to reward services also
remains a difficult issue. A checklist of simple
things done, meriting a rebate, appears a lawful
approach, but services are often assessed more in
terms of quality, and this is not so easy to judge.
Qualitative assessments are high risk, because they
are likely to be considered subjective.
In general, theMichelin judgment requires care-
ful evaluation. One can argue, as happened with
Michelin I, that thecircumstanceswereexceptional
and therefore try to distance the ruling from other
cases. One would note here, for example, the way
that the Court wraps up its ruling on reseller pres-
sure inall theelementsof thecaseas if tosay that the
overall equity in this casewas against theMichelin
system.Another elementwhichmayhaveweighed
with the Court was that, apparently, Michelin list
prices were so high that dealers were forced to sell
their tyres at a loss, until account was taken of the
rebates they were entitled to under the Michelin
scheme.
However, one can also argue that the Court has
chosen to favour a broad per se rule approach,
focusing on preserving residual competition in a
market weakened by a dominant participant, and
preferring a ‘‘bright line’’ rule over more complex,
effect-based rules.
This is all highly topical and controversial. It
will be interesting to see what happens next with
Coca-Cola’s proceedings in the Commission, pos-
sible Art.82 EC Commission Guidelines as it con-
siders modernisation in this field,66 and Virgin/
British Airways,67 another case on fidelity rebates
at the European Court.
The Italian Matches Case
In September 2003, the ECJ gave an important
judgment on state action and EC competition law
in the context of the supply of matches in Italy.68
The case arose on a reference from the Regional
Administrative Court, Lazio. The Italian Compe-
tition Authority (‘‘ICA’’) had taken a decision
against a form of commercial monopoly which
had been conferred by the Italian state on a consor-
tium of Italian match manufacturers (‘‘CIF’’). The
monopoly was long-standing, dating from 1923,
and had been amended through a judgment of the
Italian Constitutional Court and subsequent de-
crees in1983,1992and1993.The ICAhadconcerns
about:
(1) Whether the CIF, as amended, infringed
competition law;
(2) agreements between the CIF and an organis-
ation called the ‘‘Conaedi’’, which repre-
sented wholesalers of monopoly goods; and
(3) an agreement between Swedish Match and
the CIF.
Interestingly, in doing so the ICA was applying
(what was then) Art.81(1) EC, rather than Italian
competition law.
In what appears to have been a ground-breaking
initiative, the ICA found in 2000 that:
(1) to the extent that Italian law had required
participation in the CIF, it had provided a
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‘‘legal shield’’ to conduct which would
otherwise have been prohibited (this con-
cerned the monopoly until 1993);
(2) the legislative framework had to be dis-
applied by any court or public admin-
istration, such as the ICA, since it was
contrary to Arts 3(i)(g), 10 and 81(1) EC; and
(3) disapplication would imply removal of the
legal shield.
Furthermore, some of the activities of the CIF were
not required by the legal framework of the Italian
law, notably the allocation of production quotas in
a related committee, the majority of which was
constituted by producers.
The ICA noted that since 1994, participation in
the CIF had no longer been compulsory for the
production and marketing of matches in Italy, and
that membership of the CIF had become voluntary.
As a result, the conduct of the member companies
hadtobe regarded, from1994onwards, as the result
of autonomous economicdecisions, forwhich they
were responsible.
Finally, the two agreements, with the whole-
salers andwith SwedishMatch,were also contrary
to Art.81(1) EC. The former gave the CIF exclusive
control of the commercial channel of wholesale
distribution. The latter, whereby the CIF bought
a certain amount of matches from its principal
European competitor, prevented Swedish Match
from selling directly in Italy.
On appeal to the Lazio Court, themain issuewas
whether the ICAwas competent to disapply Italian
law in this way. The Italian Court was also not sure
whether therewas roomfor significant competition
between the members of CIF, prices for matches
still being set by the state. In such a system, did
quota allocationmatter?Was autonomous conduct
which restricted competition precluded? The Court
referred these issues to the ECJ.
Inanequallyground-breaking judgment, theECJ
upheld the ICA’s position. A national competition
authority could not effectively ensure that Art.81
EC is observed, if such an authority could not
declare a national measure contrary to Arts 10 and
81 EC and, as a result, be able to disapply it.69
However, in such a case the undertakings con-
cerned were still entitled to plead the national law
as a defence against any penalties, whether crimi-
nal or administrative, in respect of past conduct
required by the law concerned. The decision to
disapply the law concerned did ‘‘not alter the fact
that the lawset the framework for theundertakings’
past conduct’’. Itwas still a legal ‘‘shield’’ for public
authorities and other economic operators. Going
forward,however,once the lawwasdisapplied, the
undertakings concerned could be penalised for
their future conduct.70
If national law merely encouraged or made it
easier for undertakings to engage in autonomous
anti-competitive conduct, those undertakings could
still be penalised for infringements before the law
was disapplied. In the present context, however, the
nationallegalframeworkcouldbeamitigatingfactor.
As regards the question whether competition
could be distorted in the circumstances, the ECJ
left that to the national court to determine, while
making it clear that, in principle, the residual com-
petition possible, other than on price, could be
appreciable, and therefore a restriction of such
competition could be caught by Art.81(1) EC.
The Commission has already picked up on the
case, as a new facet to its campaign for competition
in services (where professional rules may be set in
laws).
Lysine appeals71
In July 2003, the CFI ruled on four appeals, brought
by Archer DanielsMidland (‘‘ADM’’), KyowaHakko
Kogyo, Daesang-Sewon and Cheil Jedang, against
the Commission’s lysine (amino acids) cartel deci-
sion72 in which the Commission had fined the four
companiesatotalofe81.6million.73TheCFIreduced
the fines to a total of e74.3 million.
Itmayberecalled that lysine isanaminoacidand
is used in animal feed. Nutritionists add synthetic
lysine to feedstuff like cereals or soybeans in order
to formulate protein-based diets for animals.
The case started when the American authorities
discovered in1995 thatADM,Kyowa,SewonCorp,
Cheil Corp and Ajinomoto Co Inc had formed a
cartel to fix lysine prices and to allocate sales of
lysine. In the US, the companies were fined and
three executives of ADMwere sentenced to prison.
In July1996,Ajinomotocame to theCommission
on the basis of the 1996 Leniency Notice,74 offering
to co-operate in proving the existence of a cartel in
the lysine market and its effects in the European
Economic Area (‘‘EEA’’). In June 1997, the Com-
mission ‘‘dawn-raided’’ the European premises of
ADM and Kyowa Europe, and in June 2001, the
Commission issued a decision charging the com-
panies with fixing lysine prices and sales quotas in
the EEA andwith exchanging information on their
sales volumes.
In the decision, the Commission used the 1998
Fining Guidelines75 and the 1996 Leniency Notice
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to calculate the fines. The applicants appealed the
decision in August 2000, raising various pleas for
its full-scale annulment or, at least, a reduction of
the fine.
It may be useful to focus on certain facets of the
judgments dealing with the Commission’s calcu-
lation of the fines.
First, the applicants argued that, recently, the
Commission has been imposing fines at a level that
a fewyearsagonoonewouldhavethoughtpossible.
Notably, the applicants argued that the Commis-
sion should not have used the 1998 Fining Guide-
lines in this case because the cartel was brought to
an end before the Guidelines were published. The
applicants relied on principles such as breach of
legitimate expectations, legal certainty, non-retro-
active application of penalties and equal treat-
ment.76 The Court rejected them all, saying that
use of the Guidelines amounted to a mere change
in the administrative practice of the Commission
which did not amount to an alteration of the
existing legal framework for determining fines (set
out in Art.15 of Reg.17).77
Secondly, the applicants argued the ‘‘non bis in
idem’’ principle, that a second penalty may not be
imposed on the same person for the same offence.
As mentioned above, the US (and the Canadian
authorities) had already imposed fines on the
same companies for the same cartel. One of the
issues before the CFI was whether, when calculat-
ing the fine in worldwide cartels, the Commission
hastotakeintoaccount finespreviously imposedin
non-EEA jurisdictions.
The answer was ‘‘no’’. The CFI ruled that the
Commission has no obligation to take into account
fines imposed in non-EEA countries. According to
theCourt, anundertakingmaybepenalised inmore
than one jurisdiction for the same infringement
when the penalties pursue different objectives.
Here the Commission fines aim to preserve compe-
tition in the European Union, while those of the
other jurisdictions aim to preserve competition in
their respectivemarkets. Thus, therewasnobreach
of the non bis in idem principle.78
Thirdly, the Court stressed in this case that if the
Commission proposes to impose a fine, then it has
to assess the gravity of the infringement, and in
doing so the Commission is required to assess the
actual impact of the cartel ‘‘in cases where it ap-
pears that this canbemeasured’’.79According to the
Court, the Commission’s point of reference is the
competition that would normally have existed if
there had been no infringement.80
Fourthly, the Court held that the Commission
should have looked at the turnover in the market
affected by the infringement, the EEA lysine mar-
ket, rather than worldwide turnover, as a measure
of the scale of the infringement committed by each
company.81 Citing Parker Pen,82 ADM had argued
that its fine—which exceeded its turnover in the
EEA lysine market in the last year of the infringe-
ment—was disproportionate.83
In spite of this, the Court did not consider that
the fine was overall unreasonable.84 In coming
to that conclusion, the Court seems to have been
influenced by the fact that ADM’s EEA sales of
lysine were a significant proportion of its world-
wide turnover.85
The Court said that total turnover can still come
intoplaywithregard todeterrence.There, theCourt
said that the Commission is entitled to take total
worldwide turnover into account, because that fig-
ure gives an indication of the overall size of the
undertaking and its economic power. This is con-
sidered relevant to determining the amount of the
fine thatwill deter it from infringing in the future.86
As in the Pre-insulated Pipe Cases, this must
nowbeverydisturbing for largemultinationals. Is it
really fair? Above all, why should multinational
conglomerates be fined more just because they are
built that way? One may well argue that fine levels
should be adjusted in relation to involvement in
infringements and markets affected, not just be-
cause companies are big or small. If groups are
penalised twice, they can still be sanctioned more
for recidivism, but huge fines for deterrence are a
concern.
Finally, the Court was generally demanding in
reviewing theequal treatmentof those finedandthe
related reasoning. For example, in the Cheil case,
the Court did not accept that the Commission
increased the fine on certain companies something
less than 10 per cent per year of duration, while it
increased Cheil’s fine something more than 10 per
cent per year. The Court consequently reduced
Cheil’s fine.87
Masterfoods88
In October 2003, the CFI upheld the Commission’s
decision in the Irish ice-cream case known as
‘‘Masterfoods’’.89 The Commission had found that
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Van den Bergh (a Unilever subsidiary) infringed
Arts 81 and 82 EC by supplying freezer cabinets for
impulse ice-cream with the condition that they
were not to be used for competing ice-cream
products.
It may be recalled that Van den Bergh (formerly
HB Ice Cream Ltd, ‘‘HB’’) is the leading manufac-
turer of impulse ice-cream products (‘‘single-
wrapped ice-creams for immediate consumption’’)
in Ireland. For some time, retailers had been sup-
plied with freezer cabinets, in which HB retained
ownership, for no direct charge, provided that they
were used exclusively for stocking and displaying
HB ice-cream products. In a sense, HB had created
the ice-cream market in this way, by providing
storage opportunities for its products, and it had
been very sucessful.
In 1989, Masterfoods Ltd (a subsidiary of Mars
Inc, ‘‘Mars’’) entered the Irish ice-cream market.
Some Irish retailers started to place Masterfoods’
products in their HB freezers, which led HB to
enforce the exclusivity provision in its distribution
agreements. Masterfoods then brought an action
in the Irish High Court, claiming that the HB
exclusivity clause infringed (what were then) Arts
85 and 86 EC. In May 1992, the Irish High Court
found for HB, and, in September 1992, Mars ap-
pealed against this judgment to the Irish Supreme
Court.
Masterfoods also lodged a parallel complaint
with the European Commission, as did Valley Ice
Cream Ltd. In 1998, after a first set of negotiations
and a settlement, the Commission pursued its pro-
ceedings again and decided that HB’s distribution
arrangements infringed Arts 85 and 86 EC. The
Commission also required HB to lift the freezer
exclusivity imposed on the retailers for outlets
where owning a freezer or taking a second freezer
from a competitor was not an option.90
HB appealed (and obtained suspension of the
Commission’s decision). This judgment relates to
that appeal.
As a result of the Commission’s decision, the
Irish Supreme Court decided to stay proceedings
and to refer questions to the ECJ, resulting in the
landmarkMasterfoods I ruling. The ECJ held there
that where a national court is considering issues
that are already subject to a Commission decision,
theCourtmaynot reacha judgmentwhichconflicts
with that decision, irrespective of the fact that the
Commission decision in question had been ap-
pealed to the CFI.
InHB’s appeal before theCFI, themain issuewas
foreclosure under Art.81(1) EC.
HB argued that the Commission had over-
estimated the degree of foreclosure on the relevant
market resulting from its distribution agreements
with retailers. Notably, HB pointed out that its
distribution agreements did not involve outlet
exclusivity; they merely prevented retailers from
using the freezer cabinets provided to them by
HB‘‘free of charge’’ for competing ice-cream prod-
ucts. Retailers were free to install another freezer,
paid for by them or supplied by another ice-cream
supplier.
The Court accepted this to some extent, noting
that the freezerexclusivityclausedidnotentail, ‘‘in
formal terms, an exclusive purchasing obligation
whoseobject is to restrict competition’’.91However,
the Court went on to look at the overall circum-
stances to see if, in fact,the freezer exclusivity
resulted in outlet exclusivity and, if so, whether
the Commission had correctly quantified the de-
gree of foreclosure brought about by these clauses.
Thus, the Court took into consideration all the
similar agreements entered into by Van den Bergh
and its competitors, as well as the economic and
legal context on the market.
On this approach, the Court essentially con-
firmed the Commission’s decision. In other words,
the Court considered points such as: the fact that
HB had held a dominant position on themarket for
impulse ice-cream in Ireland for a long time; the
high degree of recognition of the HB brand; HB’s
product range in Ireland; and the fact that freezers
were provided without charge. The Court found
that retailers were generally space-constrained,
and that the outlets which are the most important
for thesaleof impulse ice-creamaregenerally small
in surface and have little available space for an
additional freezer.
The Court also noted that retailers had only
rarely opted to replace freezer cabinets supplied
by HB (even though the agreements could be
terminated at any time with two months’ notice).
Inpractice, it appeared that such agreements lasted
a long time, on average eight years.
The Court also found that there was customer
demand for competing ice-cream brands. This was
evidencedbythewaythatMasterfoodshadachieved
a numeric distribution of some 42 per cent before
HB reacted to enforce its freezer exclusivity clause,
resulting in a fall to 20 per cent. Other competitors
had also obtained ahigh share in supermarket sales
in Ireland, while only achieving a low figure in
retailers.92
The Court concluded that the Commission had
rightly found foreclosure in all the circumstances.
HB’s system was found to have had a considerable
dissuasive effect on retailers with regard to the
installation of their own freezer cabinet or that of
another manufacturer, and this had ‘‘tied’’ some
40 per cent of sales outlets.93
HBalsoargued that therewasa (balancing) ‘‘rule
of reason’’ in Art.81 EC which applied here: the
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economic benefits of its system of freely providing
freezer cabinets outweighed any possible negative
effects that the (de facto) outlet exclusivity would
have on competition. The Court disagreed, stating
that the existence of such a rule in Community
competition law was not accepted:
‘‘It is only within the specific framework of Article
85(3) that the pro and anti-competitive aspects of a
restriction may be weighed. Article 85(3) would lose
much of its effectiveness if such an examination had
already to be carried out under Article 85(1) ...’’94
The Court also considered that the economic
advantages of the supply of freezer cabinets to
retailers were negated by the related exclusivity
clause95 and therefore agreedwith the Commission
that the first condition of Art.85(3) EC (economic
progress) was not met.96
As regards the finding of an infringement of the
former Art.86 EC, the Court agreed with the Com-
mission that HB was an unavoidable partner for
many ice-cream retailers in Ireland and that it had a
dominant position on that market.
As regardswhether therewasanabuse, theCourt
accepted HB’s argument that the provision of
freezer cabinets on a condition of exclusivity was
a standard practice on the relevant market. How-
ever, importantly, the Court found that whereas in
a normal competitive market those agreements
would have been concluded in the interest of the
two parties and could not be prohibited as amatter
of principle, those considerations could not be
accepted without reservation on a market where,
because of the dominant position held by a trader,
competition is already restricted.97
For adominant company to restrict 40per centof
outlets in this way was an abuse.98
As a result, the Court found that HB had effect-
ively foreclosed competing ice-cream suppliers
from entering the market, contrary to both Arts 81
and 82 EC.
Finally, theCourt found that the exercise ofHB’s
property rights could be restricted in the circum-
stances, and considered that the Commission did
not infringe the principle of subsidiarity by bring-
ing the case, in spite of the Irish proceedings, since
there were parallel issues in various otherMember
States.99
A few initial comments may be made.
First, it is interesting to see this result through
foreclosure. One might have expected the Com-
mission to bring a case like this through essential
facility doctrine (i.e. arguing that the ‘‘freezers’’
were essential in that sense). However, instead,
the case is brought on a narrow market definition
resulting in a finding of foreclosure. There is no
discussion of ‘‘essential facility’’, and it appears
that the Commission deliberately avoided it, prob-
ably because it involves such a high standard of
proofnow. Inanyevent, asimilar substantive result
appears to have been achieved.
Secondly, this is complex litigation, since the
market information required for a good assessment
is extensive. Notably, there were three major re-
ports focusingondistributionandforeclosure, and,
as iswell knownnow, thecasehas taken (too)many
years. The decision turned on many key facts, for
example that access to the rest of themarket beyond
the 40per cent ‘‘tied’’ sharewas also restricted.One
would think that in other cases, an exclusivity of
supply of 40 per centmight be accepted, if justified
for particular supply or production reasons. As
already noted, market definition was central. If the
market had been for ice-cream as a whole, super-
market access (whichcompetitorshad)wouldhave
undermined the whole case.
Thirdly, onemayquestion the result thatHBwill
not be allowed to offer free ice-cream freezer cabi-
nets to retailers in exchange for exclusivity, while
its smaller rivals may be allowed to do so (not that
small really, given that somemay includeMars and
Nestle´). The judgment does not appear entirely
clear on this. On the one hand, it appears that
parallel exclusive systemswere considered to con-
tribute to the overall foreclosure effect.1 On the
other, the Court appears to have found that the
other freezerexclusivity systemsdidnotcontribute
significantly to foreclosure of the relevant market.2
In any event, this underlines the difficult pos-
ition for dominant companies, which apparently
cannot rely on being able to use ‘‘standard’’ prac-
tices, even though they may be ‘‘normal’’ compe-
tition, if the effect is considered abusive. The
Court’s view is that ordinary business practices
may not be ‘‘competition on the merits’’ for the




In September 2003, the CFI rendered its judgment
in the Atlantic Liner Conference Case,4 annulling
fines of e273 million which the Commission had
imposed against themembers of theTrans-Atlantic
ConferenceAgreement (‘‘TACA’’) underArt.82 EC.
The TACA members operated shipping liner ser-
vicesbetweennorthernEuropeandtheUS,andhad
filed the agreement setting up the conference for
individual exemption with the Commission.
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The Commission refused to grant an exemption
under Art.81(3) EC, but could not impose fines for
violating Art.81 EC, because Art.19(4) of the mari-
time transport Reg.4056/86 excludes such fines
when an agreement was filed for exemption. How-
ever, the Commission found that the TACA mem-
bersalsoabused theircollectivedominantposition,
and therefore fined them.
The CFI upheld the Commission’s decision,
finding that the TACA infringed the competition
rules and the Commission’s refusal to grant an
exemption under Art.81(3) EC. The Court also up-
held the Commission’s finding that the restrictions
in relation to service contracts constituted an
abuse, but set aside a second finding concerning
measures inducing competitors to join the confer-
ence for lack of evidence and infringement of the
rights of the defence.
However, the fines were set aside essentially
because of the notification and mitigating circum-
stances, including the co-operation of the com-
panies and legal uncertainty over the finding of
abuse and the potential penalties.
Detailsof the (extensive) judgmentare important
for the maritime transport industry, as it clarifies
various points of the application of EC competition
law in this area.
Three points are of more general importance.
First, the judgment holds the Commission to a
high standard of proof. In the CFI’s view, the Com-
mission had not proved ‘‘to the requisite legal stan-
dard’’ that two shipping companies previously
competing with TACA joined the conference be-
cause they were induced to do so by the existing
TACAmembers. The Commission had found such
inducement to have taken place and qualified it as
an ‘‘abusive alteration of the competitive structure
of the market’’ by the collectively dominant TACA
members. The CFI found, however, that the evi-
dencedidnotexclude that the twocompanies joined
for commercial considerations and their own inter-
est. Indoing so, theCFI effectively reconsidered the
evidence in full.5
Secondly, the CFI confirms its strict stance
against violations of the right of defence. The CFI
found that theCommissionhadnever informed the
defendants, in theStatementofObjectionsorother-
wise, that it intended to use certain documents to
prove a violation of Art.82 EC. Existing case law
prohibits the use of evidence under such circum-
stances unless the defendant could reasonably
have inferred what negative conclusions the Com-
mission intended to draw from the evidence. Here,
the defendants themselves had submitted the
documents in question in response to Commission
requests for informationwhichsought todetermine
the applicability ofArt.81(3) EC. The CFI held that
this was not sufficient to warn the defendants that
the documents could be used to prove violations of
Art.82 EC and therefore excluded the use of these
documents.6
Thirdly, the judgmentholds thatunder themari-
time transport Regulation, the application for indi-
vidual exemption under Art.81 EC shields the
applicant also from fines under Art.82 EC. This
conclusionwas highly disputed before. The ruling
will, however, lose its significance with the abol-
ition of the notification system, where immunity
from fines can no longer occur.7
Other
For reasons of space, given the amount of legis-
lation this year, the author has had to be more
selective on cases. The other main judgments this
year were as follows:
 In March 2003, the CFI gave its ruling in the
FENIN case.8 The Court found that an associ-
ationofundertakingswhichmarketsmedical
goods and equipment for use in Spanish hos-
pitals did not act as an economic ‘‘undertak-
ing’’ (and therefore was not found to have
abused a dominant position by taking a long
time to pay its debts to its members—appar-
ently some 300 days).
 In March 2003, the CFI annulled the fines
which the Commission had imposed in the
FETTCSA (Far East Trade Tariff Charges and
SurchargesAgreement)case,on thebasis that
they were time-barred.9
 In June 2003, the CFI ruled on theCoe Clerici
Logistics case.10 This concerns an appeal
against a decision by the Commission reject-
ing a complaint by a ship transporter of coal
for ENEL.The transporter had applied for the
right to perform self-handling on a particular
quay in the port ofAncona linked to anENEL
depot. Another company had been given a
concessionover that quay.The case involved
an alleged infringement ofArts 82 and 86EC.
The CFI dismissed the application.
 In September 2003, the ECJ upheld the CFI’s
judgmentintheVolkswagen (parallel imports)
case.11
 InOctober2003, theECJgenerallyupheld the
CFI’s judgment on the Commission’s Steel
Beams decision, imposing e104 million in
fines on various steel-makers. However, the
CFI annulled the judgment as regards Arbed
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SAandtheCommission’sdecision inso faras
it concerns that undertaking. The ECJ also
partially annulled the judgment against
Sideru´rgica Aristrain Madrid, and referred
the matter back to the CFI to determine the
amount of the fine that Aristrain is still
required to pay.12
 In October 2003, the CFI essentially upheld
the Commission’s decision in the Opel (par-
allel imports) case, although it reduced the
fine from e43 million to e35.5 million.13
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In the second half of this article, John Ratliff surveys:
 Commission cases on cartels, horizontal co-operation, distribution and Articles 82/86 EC (including
the Vitamins andNintendo decisions published this year).
 The current policy focus on opening up the liberal professions to more competition and the
Commission’s consultation to see if reform of the Council liner conference block exemption may
be justified.
 Areas of specific interest, notably several Commission cases aiming to foster competition in gas
supply in various parts of Europe.
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